For a while these new security measures helped to quiet down the furor, but in November 2003 Menino renewed his call for an end to LNG shipments after US government scientists confirmed that an LNG tanker attack would have dire consequences. Menino accused federal and industry officials of playing “Russian roulette” with the safety of the city.
Even though the ruckus had largely quieted down, there continued to be calls to close down the Everett facility. Securing the ships’ transits had become routine — which meant, from a terrorist’s perspective, that they were potentially vulnerable to a surprise attack. Khalid also liked the symbolism of striking so close to Logan airport, which had served as one of the stepping-off points of the 9/11 attacks. If they succeeded, it would help reinforce the message that committed jihadists could strike where and when they pleased.
On the West Coast, San Pedro Bay is home to a massive port complex shared by Los Angeles and Long Beach. Surfing the Internet, Nabih discovered that all the main pipelines to the major refineries are located on the Long Beach side of the harbor. This meant that large oil tankers, such as the 300,000 ton Limburg, would have to enter from the sea by way of the Long Beach channel. If the main channel could be blocked by a sabotaged tanker and the resultant massive oil spill, other ships would not be able to enter or leave. Containing the oil spill and salvaging the sunken vessel would be a daunting and time-consuming challenge.
A bit more research revealed that when the 629-foot freight ship New Carissa, of Panamanian registry and carrying 400,000 gallons of fuel, ran ground of Coos Bay, Oregon, it took more than three months and the involvement of 58 federal agencies and more than 700 people to deal with the resulting wreck and oil spill. Marine accidents on the West Coast have become increasingly rare, which has translated into there not being enough demand to support a commercial salvage industry there. This means that it would likely take weeks to clear a major wreck sunk in Long Beach Harbor. In the interim, the region’s refineries would be idled within a week and the nation’s most populous region would literally run out of gas.
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All but the last two paragraphs excerpted from The Edge of Disaster by Stephen Flynn. Copyright © 2007 by Stephen Flynn. Reprinted by arrangement with The Random House Publishing Group.
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Nabih also learned that while Americans seemed to be talking a great deal about port security, they had really not done much about it. The Port of Los Angeles has 7500 acres of waterways and facilities, and 43 miles of waterfront. This infrastructure is being protected by a port police force of just over 100 officers, and a diverse collection of private security services hired by the marine terminal. Long Beach’s equivalent area of waterways and facilities is even more exposed: just a dozen Long Beach police officers and a small cadre of port security personnel patrol a waterfront protected primarily by private security guards hired by terminal operators. There are other federal, state, county, and city agencies that have some level of jurisdiction in this massive port complex, but all maintain only a tiny presence. Too often, confusion over who should be in charge leaves many security gaps unattended. In the five years since 9/11, Los Angeles had received just $25 million dollars in federal grants to improve its port security, less than what Washington spends on airport security every two days.
By surfing the Web, the terrorist planner was able to find a July 2006 Seattle Times article describing the experiences of a reporter who easily penetrated the security of ports in Los Angeles-Long Beach and Seattle. All he had to do was hitch a ride from a few immigrant truck drivers coming to drop off and pick up cargo. The one time when the reporter was asked for identification, he flashed an expired driver’s license to a uniformed guard standing 15 feet away, who then waved him through the gate.
Regarding the Americans’ ability to deal with the risk of a small-boat attack, beginning in 2002, the Coast Guard had deployed armed maritime safety and security teams to operate out of 13 US ports, including Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Boston. However, even the commandant of the US Coast Guard seemed apprehensive that the service was not ready to deal with the threat. Admiral Thad Allen had publicly declared that while its own threat and vulnerability analysis had confirmed that there was a real risk, “We haven’t put nearly as much thinking in science and technology and (general) thought into the small-vessel threat as we need to.”